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Wednesday, March 23, 2016

Child Soldiers of The Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/child_solders.htm


Child Soldiers of The Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

According to an April 2000 estimate, there are some 2,000 children in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) ranks. This is not unique to LTTE or Sri Lanka but is a global phenomenon. The number of child soldiers, some as young as seven years, participating in the various armed conflicts around the world is estimated to be about 300,000.
Battlefields with Child Combatants
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Bangladesh
Burma (Myanmar)
Burundi
Cambodia
Colombia
Congo-Brazzaville
Congo-Kinshasa (former Zaire)
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Ex-Yugoslavia
Indonesia/East Timor
India/Kashmir
Iraq/Kurdistan
Iran
Israel/Occupied Territories
Lebanon
Liberia
Mexico
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Peru
Philippines
Russia/Chechnya
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Tajikistan
Turkey/Kurdistan
Uganda
 

Participation in armed conflicts, even voluntarily, by children below the age of 15 is an offence, according to the Geneva Convention, 1948, and the two amendments to it, adopted in 1997, as well as Article 38 of the UN Convention on Rights of the Child. In the decade ending 1999, nearly two million child soldiers were killed in the various conflicts, worldwide.
Children are recruited at a time when there is a significant reduction in the numbers of available adults. Besides, analysts point that advances in technology have facilitated the recruitment of children. Weapons, now in vogue in armed conflicts, are light and automatic, and hence, easy for children to handle. Also, children are less likely to disobey orders and can easily be prodded to undertake daring assignments, many a time ending up in death.
Children join armed conflicts for different reasons. While some sign up voluntarily others are recruited by force. Those joining voluntarily do so on account of the poor economic condition of their family, or because they wish to avenge the suffering or death of a member of the family at the hands of 'the enemy', or simply because of the thrill it gives. Indoctrination through lectures at schools, screening of films, commemorative events such as Heroes Day plays a significant role in attracting children into the LTTE’s fold. Several accounts of from Sri Lanka support the above reasons.
Serious recruitment of children (and women) into the LTTE began after the LTTE decided to take on the Indian Peace Keeping Force, which was sent to the Island nation in 1987 as part of an agreement, between Sri Lanka and India, that sought to resolve the ethnic conflict in the former.
Even earlier, children formed a part of the Tiger cadres. Child soldiers were originally recruited into the LTTE’s baby brigade, commandeered by Justin. But, after 1987, they were integrated with adult units. Initially recruited from refugee children in India, they were reportedly sent to a training camp in the southern Indian port town of Pondicherry. Supervised by one Basheer Kaka of Trincomalee, the training then was non-military and essentially concerned with physical exercises and education.
Child cadres in the LTTE perform various duties. At one end, they are employed in the kitchen and in medical camps and are asked to do menial jobs. Also, they are posted in the supplies division where they distribute arms and ammunition to other cadres. Above these, they are assigned to gather intelligence and fight alongside adult cadres. Reports indicate that they also functioned as the bodyguards of Pottuamman, the LTTE’s chief of intelligence.

Normally, a training programme runs through four months. At times, owing to the exigency of immediate requirement on the battlefield, the programme was cut short by three months. The cadres, children, begin their day early. They are required to fall in at 5.00am. Thereafter, they go through physical training followed by training in battle and field craft and parade drill. Further into the day, child combatants read LTTE literature. Some more physical training and instruction on communications, explosives and intelligence gathering follow.
Induction onto the field commences with attacking less defended targets. For instance, they are sent to attack villages that do not have any significant armed cover. On the battlefield, the child combatants fought and died much like the adult soldiers. They participated, and still do, in daring attacks to capture weapons as well as territory.
The LTTE’s child soldiers saw their first recorded major action on November 22, 1990. In this attack on the Mankulam army camp, nearly a third of the Sri Lankan troops were killed and the camp was vacated by troops after two days of clashes. Their second major action was the attack on the strategic Elephant Pass Military Complex less than a year later, on July 10, 1991. The Tigers suffered heavy casualties in this attack. An estimated 550 LTTE cadres, including children, were killed in these clashes. Learning from its failures during the July 1991 operations, the LTTE changed the composition of its attacking groups. It put the child cadres together with elite Black Tigers cadres and scored astonishing results, one in 1993 and another in 1996––two army/navy complexes were overrun and an estimated US $ 100 million-worth arms and ammunition were seized by the Tigers. In the 1996 amphibious attack on the military complex in Mullaithivu, child soldiers shot dead some 300 troops after they were disarmed.
The fiercest of all LTTE-fighting units, analysts have noted, is the Leopard Brigade, or Siruthai Puli. It consists exclusively of children whose unswerving loyalty to Tiger chief Prabhakaran and their commitment have attracted considerable attention. Among their actions is the gunning down of 200 elite government troops on December 4, 1997, in Kanakarankulam, Wanni.
The child combatants themselves have suffered numerous casualties in various clashes. In October 1995, in the attack on the Weli Oliya military complex, regarded by analysts as the worst-ever set back to the child fighters, some 3,000 cadres, a vast majority of them children and women, were killed by government troops. Official sources disclosed that in one battle alone, in September/October, 1998, at Kilinochchi, over 500 child soldiers might have been killed. Around the same time, in all, an estimated 1,700 LTTE cadres had died in battles at Kilinochchi, Paranthan and Mankulam. The killed child combatants, along with several women fighters, constituted the frontlines in those battles. Soon after, the LTTE reportedly stepped up its recruitment drive among children in the eastern Batticaloa district to make up for lost cadres.
26 LTTE child soldiers, including four girls who surrendered to the armed forces at Mankulam, in early October 1998, disclosed that the LTTE kidnapped and recruited them into is fighting forces. Some of them were picked up from their homes while some others were hustled into a waiting vehicle.

The surrender of these child soldiers was accorded international publicity. Soon thereafter, at a meeting held in New York between Prof. G. L. Peiris, Sri Lanka’s Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister, and Olara Otunnu, the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Rapporteur for Children and Armed Conflict, Otunnu expressed his disappointment at the LTTE’s breach of pledge. The LTTE had earlier promised him that it would not recruit children under 17 years of age and would not deploy them before they attained 18 years of age.

Despite its assurances, the LTTE, reports indicate, has not given up on recruiting child combatants. A February 2000 report warned that the LTTE would be targeting children in the Wanni, where it was reportedly organising a vigorous recruitment drive. The report, citing the logic of numbers, said that the LTTE, in order to, make up 10,000 lost cadres, between 1995 and 1999, would have to target some 30 per cent of the school-going children who have come of age.

75% LAND SRI LANKA NEVER HAD --SO IF MR WAS NOT HERE WE WOULD HAVE LOTS THE REST

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Incidents and Staments involving LTTE: 2016, 2015, 2014, 201320122011201020092008,2007200620052004

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is the only terrorist group which once possessed its own ‘Military’ – Tigers (infantry), Sea Tigers (sea wing) and Air Tigers (Air Wing), in the world, began its armed campaign in Sri Lanka for a separate Tamil homeland in 1983. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in its January 10, 2008 report said that the LTTE is one of the most dangerous and deadly extremist outfits in the world and the world should be concerned about the outfit as they had ‘inspired’ networks worldwide, including the al-Qaeda in Iraq.
However, with the killing of its Chief Velupillai Prabhakaran on May 18, 2009 and its defeat it in Eelam War IV the outfit has become inactive inside Sri Lanka, though reports indicate that it still attempts to revive itself with the help of Tamil Diaspora.


The LTTE has been proscribed, designated or banned as a terrorist group by a number of Governments - India, Malaysia, USA, Canada, UK, Australia, European Union - where the LTTE has significant terrorist infrastructure for disseminating propaganda, raising funds, procuring and shipping supplies to support their terrorist campaign in Sri Lanka. While India was the first country to ban LTTE in May, 1992, Sri Lanka itself is the latest in the list banning the organisation on January 7, 2009.
Formation
The LTTE was formed on May 5, 1976, under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran, and has emerged as perhaps the most lethal, well organised and disciplined terrorist force. Headquartered in the Wanni region, Prabhakaran has established an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep track of any outsiders who enter the group's area of control.
Terrorism in Sri Lanka began in 1970 with the formation of a militant student body called the "Tamil Students Movement" to protest government plans  REAL NEED  WAS THE NEED TO  DO  BIG UNDERWORLD BUSINESS USING ANY WHO FEEL READY TO GO UNDERWORLD.  EVEN TODAY THEY ARE LAMENTING THE ABSENCE OF MAJOR BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY.HE WAR

Very soon this movement went underground and turned to overt terrorist activities. Violence escalated in Jaffna from 1972 onwards, beginning with the publication of a new constitution seen by the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) as anti-Tamil. The year 1972 saw the formation of two Tamil terrorist groups – the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), splinter groups of the original Tamil Students Movement. In July 1983, countrywide riots and clashes between Sinhalese and Tamils left thousands of Tamils dead and several hundred thousand as refugees. Large number of Government forces were deployed in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. This period marks the beginning of the LTTE guerrilla campaign against the Sri Lankan Government.
Objective
The LTTE aims to create a separate homeland for the Tamils known as the Tamil Eelam (State) in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. The Tigers control most of the areas in the Northern Province but also conduct operations throughout the island. They have recently been wiped out of the Eastern Province and are losing considerable ground in the Northern Province.
Leadership, Command Structure and Cadre
The LTTE leadership was organized along a two-tier structure: a military wing and a subordinate political wing. Overseeing both was a central governing committee, headed by the LTTE chief, Velupillai Prabhakaran. This body had the responsibility for directing and controlling several specific subdivisions, including, an amphibious group (the Sea Tigers headed by Soosai), an airborne group (the Air Tigers led by Prabhakaran’s Son Charles Anthony), an elite fighting wing (known as the Charles Anthony Regiment, named after Anthony, a close associate of Prabhakaran and was earlier headed by Balraj who died of illness on May 20, 2008), a suicide commando unit (known as the Black Tigers) & a highly secretive intelligence group both headed by Pottu Amman and a political office headed by B. Nadesan. The central governing committee also had an International Secretariat (headed by Veerakathy Manivannam a.k.a. Castro), which was in charge of the outfit’s global network. Most of these leaders, however, were killed during the Eelam War IV.
Prabhakaran headed the LTTE power structure, as chairman of its central governing committee and ‘commander-in-chief’ of its Army. He was assisted by B. Nadesan, his political advisor, and his intelligence Chief Pottu Amman.
The LTTE cadre strength dwindled since the Government’s onslaught in July 2006 and there was no specific information about its cadre strength. On December 29, 2007, the Sri Lankan Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka had said that the LTTE is left with only 3,000 cadres. The General then on January 11, 2008 speculated the total cadre strength to be about 4,500. At its peak, the organisation has cadre strength of about 18,000. On January 8, 2004, the then Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga alleged that the outfit increased its military strength during the truce period by recruiting over 11,000 guerrillas. "The LTTE has increased its cadre by three times from around seven thousand to over 18,000. Quite a few of them are small children and forcible recruitment was going on," she said. Earlier on January 22, 2003, the Sri Lankan President's office indicated that the LTTE had increased its fighting forces during the cease-fire period "by 10,000 cadres, most of whom were children." Citing intelligence sources, Presidential spokesperson Harim Peiris said that the LTTE strength had increased from "around 6,000 cadre'' before the February 2002 cease-fire agreement "to 16,000'', and charged that "kidnapping for forcible recruitment'' was a major recruiting mode of the outfit. According to another estimate, the LTTE's deployment increased from 9,390 before the cease-fire agreement was signed to 16,240 towards the end of 2002.
All cadres were carefully indoctrinated on the authorised position: they are fighting against an unresponsive and discriminatory Sinhalese majority for a separate State – Eelam; the cadres must banish all fear of death from their minds and be prepared to lay down their lives fighting the Government forces, or consume the cyanide pill fastened around their necks when capture is imminent. The LTTE placed immense emphasis on the cult of martyrdom.
LTTE cadres were known for their high sense of discipline, dedication, strong determination, a high degree of motivation and innovation. Bulldozers were suitably adapted to function as armoured vehicles. Men, women and children – both boys and girls - comprised its cadres. A deliberate policy of recruiting women and children into LTTE cadres was initiated after the signing of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) Accord in 1987, to offset a severe shortage of manpower, because of ever increasing casualties and the escalation of the conflict. Nearly one-third of the LTTE cadre comprised women, who are assigned duties on the battlefield, in the kitchen, and in medical camps as nurses. There were allegations of the LTTE abducting children from areas under its controls to fill its dwindling ranks, and an estimated 1600 children were in LTTE rank.
All LTTE fighters underwent a programme of rigorous training. A typical training schedule is spread over four months, during which they receive training in handling weapons, battle and field craft, communications, explosives and intelligence gathering, as well as an exhausting physical regimen and rigorous indoctrination.
While the Vituthalai Pulikal Makalir Munani (Women's Front of the Liberation Tigers headed by Col. Vithusha) was formed in 1983, women began combat training in 1985. In October 1987, Prabhakaran set up the first training camp exclusively for women in Jaffna for the second and successive batches. By 1989, this unit secured its own leadership structure. This period reportedly witnessed the highest recruitment of women as it was also the time when women were the worst sufferers of the ethnic conflict.
Media reports also indicated that women were being forced to join the LTTE, according to letters purportedly recovered from slain woman militants in Sri Lanka. "Every LTTE cadre is anxious to see his or her parents and I will come home for Pongal (harvest festival – January 14) though I do not know what my fate will be," said one letter recovered by Security Forces from a slain woman militant. "Amma, what can I do? When all those at home in the area were taken away, I too had to go with them (LTTE)," said another, which was released by the Media Centre for National Security, according to Times of Indiareport on January 30. A report in the Chennai-based The Hindu said on March 10, 2002, that nearly 4,000 women LTTE cadres have been killed since they began taking part in combat from 1985, joining the LTTE pantheon of over 17,000 "heroes" in the nearly two decade-old conflict. Over 100 of the women killed belonged to the dreaded Black Tiger suicide squad. Former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated on the night of May 21, 1991, during an election rally at Sriperumbudur in Tamil Nadu by Dhanu, a woman suicide-bomber of the LTTE.
The women reportedly underwent the same tough training as men, and like them, are broken up into fighting, intelligence gathering, political and administrative units. In her book Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers (1989), Adele Ann, the Australian-born wife of Anton Balasingham, LTTE theoretician who died in December 2006, described the decision by a Tamil woman to join the organisation as a message to society "that they are not satisfied with the social status quo; it means they are young women capable of defying authority; it means they are women with independent thoughts; young women prepared to lift up their heads." LTTE chief Prabhakaran, in an address to women cadres on International Women's Day on March 8, 1996, had described the liberation of the Tamil woman as "the fervent child" that was born out of the Tamil "national liberation movement." Women in the LTTE were allegedly forced to suppress their femininity and sexuality, which is regarded as a crime and an evil force that could sap their strength. Marriage was not allowed for women cadres up to the age of 25 and for men up to the age of 28.
Children featured prominently in the LTTE's protracted guerilla and terrorist campaigns, and assessments by the Sri Lankan Directorate of Military Intelligence have estimated that as much as 60 per cent of the LTTE's fighters were below 18. Estimates based on LTTE fighters who have been killed in combat reveal that 40 per cent of its fighting forces - including both males and females - were between 9 and 18 years of age. The first recruitment of child soldiers into LTTE ranks dates back over two decades, after the ethnic riots of July 1983 resulted in a massive exodus of civilians to India. At this stage, LTTE chief Prabhakaran selected Basheer Kaka, an LTTE leader from the harbour city of Trincomalee, to establish a training base in the State of Pondicherry in India for recruits under 16. Initially, the child soldiers - affectionately referred to as 'Tiger cubs' - received non-military training, mostly primary education and physical exercise. By early 1984, the nucleus of the LTTE 'Baby Brigade' or 'Bakuts', was formed.
Until 1986, the LTTE had sufficient adult units in operation and young recruits were put through the Tigers' standard grueling four-month training course as soon as they reached 16. Many children from the Pondicherry batch achieved battle prominence, and several others served as bodyguards to Pottu Amman, the LTTE Chief of Intelligence responsible, among a host of other operations, for planning the assassination of two world leaders. The child fighters were originally a part of the Baby Brigade commanded by Justin, a Pondicherry-trained fighter. However, after 1987 the LTTE integrated children with other units to offset heavy losses in combat. A study by a UK-based Sri Lankan researcher Dushy Ranatunge revealed that at least 60 per cent of the dead LTTE fighters were under 18 and were mostly girls and boys aged 10-16. Ranatunge also revealed that almost all of the casualties were from Batticaloa, but after the escalation in the fighting following the LTTE assaults on the Kilinochchi, Paranthan and Elephant Pass defences on 1 February 1998, the dead have also included many from Jaffna.
A typical unit of children was trained for four months in the jungle. Woken at 0500hrs they assembled, fell in line, and their leader raised the LTTE flag. This was followed by two hours of physical training, after which the recruits engaged in weapons training, battle and field craft, and parade drill. During the rest of the afternoon, time was spent both reading LTTE literature and more physical training. Lectures on communications, explosives and intelligence techniques continued into the evening. No contact was permitted between the camp and the children's homes during the training period. Sleep and food were regulated during training to build endurance. After 1990, when children were pitched into battle against Sri Lankan forces, the LTTE made training tougher. The military office of the LTTE headed by Wedi Dinesh developed a training programme that would make the child fighters even more daring than adults. This included the screening of Rambo-style videos in which the daredevil approach is invariably successful. The trained child fighters were also prepared for battle by attacking unprotected or weakly defended border villages. Several hundred men, women and children have been killed by LTTE child combatants armed with automatic weapons guided by experienced fighters during such 'inoculation attacks'.
Operational Strategies and External Linkages
Apart from the military operations which the LTTE conducted in the North-eastern parts of the country against Government forces and the highly successful suicide killings operations in other parts of the country, a major aspect of the LTTE’s operations was its publicity, fund-raising and military procurement strategies.
The LTTE is still believed to have a wide network of publicity and propaganda activities with offices and cells located in at least 54 countries. The largest and most important centres were located in leading western states with large Tamil expatriate communities, most notably the UK, France, Germany, Switzerland, Canada and Australia. In addition to these States, the LTTE is also known to be represented in countries as far-flung as Cambodia, Burma, South Africa and Botswana. It’s publicity networks covering Europe, Australia and North America also included radio and TV satellites.
Apart from publicity, another important aspect of LTTE’s strategy is fundraising. The majority of financial support comes from six main areas, all of which contain large Tamil Diasporas: Switzerland, Canada, Australia, the UK, the US, and the Scandinavian countries. The LTTE has established a wide network of offices and cells practically across the globe. They have secured a considerable degree of visibility in the United Kingdom – the headquarters of its "International Secretariat" – as well as in Canada, France, Germany, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Australia and South Africa. These networks of offices and cells carry out propaganda, organise the procurement and movement of weapons and raise funds from the Tamil Diaspora.
There also have been reports that the LTTE raises money through drug running, particularly heroin from Southeast and Southwest Asia. The LTTE is in a particularly advantageous position to traffic narcotics due to the highly efficient international network it has developed to smuggle munitions around the world. Many of these arms routes pass either directly through or very close to major drug producing and transit centres, including Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, southern China, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Military and arms procurement played a vital part in the LTTE’s battle against the Government sources. The LTTE arms network was headed by Kumaran Pathmanathan colloquially known as "KP." At the heart of the KP’s operations was a highly secretive shipping network. The ships frequently visit Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, South Africa, Burma, Turkey, France, Italy and Ukraine, scouting for arms. In addition to setting up a number of lucrative businesses, the LTTE established a state-of-the-art boatyard that manufactured a dozen different boats, including a mini-submarine for debussing divers.
The LTTE had also set up a parallel civil administration within its territory by establishing structures such as a Police force, law courts, postal services, banks, administrative offices, television and radio broadcasting station, etc. The most prominent of the LTTE ‘state structure' is the ‘Tamil Eelam Judiciary’ and the ‘Tamil Eelam Police’. The ‘Tamil Eelam Police’, with its headquarters at Kilinochchi was formed in year 1993, and reportedly has several wings, including traffic, crime prevention, crime detection, information bureau, administration and a special force. LTTE cadres collect taxes, its courts administer their version of justice and the entire law and order machinery is LTTE-controlled.
Areas of Operation
The LTTE engaged the Sri Lankan State in three theatres: (1) in the northern theatre (Jaffna, Vavuniya, Mannar, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu Districts) the LTTE employed high and mid-intensity warfare. Since the mid-1990s, semi-conventional and unconventional (insurgent and terrorist) methods were also being used. With the loss of the peninsula in 1996, the LTTE reverted to unconventional warfare, mostly sparrow tactics (hit and run methods). In the mainland, mostly in Wanni, the LTTE engaged the Sri Lankan troops semi-conventionally. This become possible after the LTTE acquired artillery and heavy mortars. (2) In the eastern theatre (Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Ampara Districts), the LTTE employed high, mid and low intensity warfare. Dependent on the LTTE force level, it engaged the troops semi-conventionally or unconventionally. (3) In the Southern as well as Western theatre, LTTE’s operations were largely focussed on the Colombo, the capital. By targeting financial nerve centres and political and military leaders this diversionary tactic of the LTTE had been highly effective. After steadily shifting the theatre of terror into the seat of the country’s administration, LTTE elimination of political and military leaders adversely affected the morale of the Security Forces.
The Split
The LTTE, however, faced a vertical split in the organisation when it’s Eastern ‘Commander’ ‘Colonel’ Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan aka Karuna Amman broke-away from the parent organisation and formed his own group – a military wing known as Tamil National Front and a Political wing called the Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) in alliance with the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) - in March 2004. Karuna later joined the Government. Karuna’s deputy in TMVP, Chandrakanthan alias Pillayan, now heads TMVP and is also the Chief Monster of the Eastern Province.
The Defeat of LTTE
The LTTE, which, at one time, controlled over 15,000 square kilometres or nearly one-fourth of the 65,332 square kilometres territory of the island nation, was finally decimated with the killing of Prabhakaran on May 18, 2009 and the Government officially declaring the need of Eelam War IV on May 20.
Colombo is now pursuing several Governments to dismantle three broad groups that are now assumed to be controlling the remaining pro-LTTE international factions: the US group is said to be headed by V. Rudrakumaran, the UK group by Aruththanthai Emmanuel of the World Tamil Forum (WTF) and the Norway group by Nediyavan.

Incidents and Staments involving LTTE: 2016, 20152014, 201320122011201020092008,2007200620052004

Political Leaders Assassinated by The LTTE

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/database/leaders_assassinated_byLTTE.htm


Prominent Political Leaders Assassinated by The LTTE

NamePost HeldDate Assassinated
Jeyaraj Fernandopulle
Highway Minister
April 7, 2008
D.M. Dissanayake
Non-Cabinet Minister for Nation Building
January 8, 2008
T. Maheshwaran
Member of Parliament
January 1, 2008
Herath Abeyweera
Chief Secretary to the Eastern Province
July 16, 2007
Kethesh Logananathan
Deputy Secretary-General of the Government's SCOPP
August 12, 2006
Nataraja raviraj
Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP, Jaffna
August 8, 2006
Joseph Pararajasingham
Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP, Batticaloa
December 25, 2005
Lakshman Kadirgamar
Foreign Affairs Minister
August 12, 2005
M.L. Baithullah
Peoples Alliance Candidate
2 October 2000
Cheliyan Perimpanayakam
Peoples Alliance Candidate & Former Mayor, Batticoloa
10 September 2000
C. V. Goonaratne
Federal Minister, Industrial Development
7 June 2000
Aruna De Silva
Deputy Mayor, Dehiwala
7 June 2000
Marias Anton aka David
People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) leader, Mannar
10 December 1999
Atputharajah Nadarajah, Alias Ramesh
Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) leader
2 November, 1999
Nagalingam Manikkadasan
Military wing leader, PLOTE
2 September 1999
Neelan Thiruchelvam
MP and TULF leader
29 July 1999
Muthulingam Ganesh Kumar a.k.a Razeek
Leader, Razeek group, Batticaloa
29 May 1999
Ponnuyhurai Sivapalan
Jaffna Mayor; succeeded Yogeswaran
11 September 1998
S. Shanmuganadan
MP
15 July 1998
Ms. Sarojini Yogeswaran
Jaffna Mayor
17 May 1998
Mohammad Maharoof
Member of Parliament (MP), Trincomalee
20 July 1997
Arunachalam Thangathurai
MP, Trincomalee
5 July 1997
Thomas Anton
Deputy Mayor, Batticaloa
26 October 1995
Karavai Kandamasamy
Deputy Chairman, Democratic People's Liberation Front
31 December 1994
Gamini Disanayake
Presidential candidate, UNP
24 October 1994
G. M. Premachandra
MP
24 October 1994
Weerasinghe Mallimarachchi
MP
24 October 1994
Dr. Ganini Wijesekarea
MP
24 October 1994
Ossie Abeygunasekara
MP
24 October 1994
Ranasinghe Premadasa
President, Sri Lanka
1 May 1993
Rajiv Gandhi
Former Prime Minister, India
22 May 1991
Ranjan Wijeratne
Minister of State, Defence, Sri Lanka
2 March 1991
K. Kanagaratnam
MP, Eastern Province
15 July 1990
T. Ganeshalingam
Minister, North East Provincial Council
28 June 1990
K. Padmanabha
General Secretary, Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)
19 June 1990
V. Yogasankari
MP, Jaffna
19 June 1990
P. Kirubakaran
Finance Minister, North East Provincial Council
19 June 1990
Sam Tambimuttu
MP, Batticaloa
7 May 1990
Uma Maheswaran
PLOTE Leader
July 16, 1989
A. Amrithalingam
General Secretary, TULF
13 July 1989
V. Yogeswaran
Former MP, Jaffna
13 July 1989
A. Majeed
Former MP, Mutur,
13 November 1987
Sri Sabarathnam
TELO leader
6 May 1986
K. Alalasunderam
MP, Kopay
3 September 1985
V. Dharmalingam
MP, Manipay
3 September 1985
A. Thiagarajah
MP, Vaddukoddai
25 May 1981
Alfred Duraiyapah
Former Mayor, Jaffna
27 July 1975

. Sri Lankan Navy is entering the sea adjoining the land in our control -LTTE

http://transcurrents.com/tamiliana/archives/166


The Marine battle over ‘MV Pearl Cruise II’: An Overview

May 14th, 2006
By D.B.S. Jeyaraj
The marine battle over “MV Pearl Cruise II” is over and the troop ship carrying 710 security personnnel has docked safely at Kankesanthurai (KKS) . The consequences of the attack launched by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) against the naval vessel are continuing still. One such result is the decision by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission to suspend all naval monitoring activity until further notice.
It all began when a naval flotilla escorting the personnel – carrier ship to KKS from Trincomalee came under heavy attack by a sea tigers unit. The sea battle resulted in the destruction of two “Dvoras” and the deaths of at least twenty – one persons from both the Navy and tigers.
The MV “Pearl cruise II” is a merchant vessel now used by the navy to transport men and materials by sea. The ship had started off from Trincomalee at dawn with 710 security personnel on board. These included a number of army and air force personnel in addition to navy sailors.
The bulk of the men were security personnel returning from home to duty. Most of them were in civilian dress and were unarmed. The “pearl cruise II ” was provided security by six Fast attack craft and one gun boat.
The LTTE through its alert intellige network became aware of the ” Pearl Cruise II” starting out from Trinco.On the morning of May 11th the LTTE had sent an urgent letter to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. The letter signed by Political commissar Suppiah Paramu Thamilselvan was curt and precise.
” We have on several occasions verbally informed you to refrain from boarding Sri Lankan Naval vessels. We have also given this request in writing to you twice so far. This is the third request from us to you to refrain from boarding Sri Lankan Naval vessels. Sri Lankan Navy is entering the sea adjoining the land in our control and disrupting the fishing activities of the people. It is also disturbing the LTTE exercises in doing so. If Sri Lankan Navy disrupts our activities we will definitely retaliate. SLMM monitors are used by the Sri Lankan Navy as human shields in order to continue with these disruptions. We urge you for the last time not to be on board Sri Lankan Naval vessels until further notice from us. If you chose to ignore our warning and request, we are not responsible for the consequences. Please take this as the last warning to you to not board Sri Lankan Naval vessels” it said.
The LTTE had sent two letters in similiar vein to the SLMM. The third missive issued a last warning. Apparently the SLMM had no inkling of the serious intent behind that warning. Subsequent events were to prove that the letter sent on May 11th by the tigers had a definite purpose.
The naval flotilla was in Northern waters off the coast of Vadamaratchy East when a fleet of eighteen Sea tiger and black sea tiger boats started out from the Chundikkulam – Challai sea tiger base. They approached the naval convoy from the rear.
The sea tiger boats were equipped with 20 mm, 23 mm and .50 calibre guns. They also had powerful outboard motors affixed to the boats. This enabled them to move really fast. It is estimated that they were sailing at 30 – 35 knots top speed.
Two FAC ships and the gunboat were sailing ahead of the personnel carrier. Four “Dvoras” were following behind. The three vessels in front had gone too far ahead when the tigers struck .
The four Dvoras reportedly sped up and offered resistance to the LTTE. All four were modelled on Israeli proto-types and assembled in Colombo dockyards The vessels were P- 418, P – 420. P- 421, and P – 497 respectively.They were commanded by Lt Cmdr Edirisinghe (P – 418), Lt Cndr Wijewardene (P- 420), Lt. Walgampaya (P – 421 ) and Lt. Rathnatilleke (P – 497 ) respectively.
The “Pearl Cruise II” remained virtually isolated when the sea skirmish began. P – 418 and P – 420 were in the vanguard and bore the brunt of marine combat against the sea tigers.
The sea battle ensued at a point about 30 nautical miles to the South – East of Point Pedro. The time was around 4. 30 to 4.35 pm.
There were two Scandinavian ceasefire monitors accompanying the convoy. One was Ilkka Happlina the head of Trincomalee SLMM division who was on the “Pearl Cruise II”. The other was Jaffna SLMM division deputy head Lars Bleymann who was on the P – 421 Dvora. Both vessels were flying the SLMM flag to indicate that monitors were aboard.
Lars Bleymann had a satellite phone. He was in touch with SLMM headquarters relaying news of the attack. He was also worried about the safety of Happlina and himself.
Meanwhile some sea tiger boats tried to surround the lone personnel carrier vessel at mid sea. Though the tigers could have destroyed and sunk the ship the objective seemed to be that of seizing the vessel with its crew and passengers.A stand – off at sea was on.
The fact that the ship had a ceasefire monitor from Finland on board may also have contributed towards the tiger’s reluctance to attack the ship forcefully. Six of the LTTE boats were packed with explosives and manned by black sea tigers. Ramming the suicide boats into the ship would have been simple. Yet it was not done.
With the four Dvora fast attack craft vessels engaging the sea tigers at sea the tide turned. The passenger ferry was instructed to sail on through international waters towards Indian waters. The three vessels that had gone ahead were also asked to turn back and follow the passenger ferry. Two Dvoras on patrol in North – Western waters near Neduntheevu or Delft were also instructed to turn around to help their beleaguered comrades
The SLMM headquarters in Colombo was furious at the threat to its members. Oslo too was angered. Massive pressure was exerted on the LTTE in Kilinochchi and abroad. The tigers were pressurised to call off its boats and let the “Pearl Cruiser” proceed safely.
Ms Helen Olafsdottir, spokesperson of the monitoring mission told media later that they (SLMM) contacted the Kilinochchi-based LTTE leadership immediately after the Sea Tigers triggered the clash off the Mullaitivu coast.
“We urged them to cease the offensive and reminded them of the presence of Nordic naval monitors on board two vessels,” she said. “They asked us to get them out.”
Meanwhile the personnel carrier was moving away fast towards Indian waters. The “MV Pearl Cruise II” crossed the International Maritime Boundaty Line and reached Indian sanctuary.
At this point of time a desperate Government in Colombo contacted New Delhi urgently. Indian assistance was requested to rescue the ship from LTTE clutches and escort it to KKS or Trincomalee.
According to informed diplomatic sources India was prepared to provide security to Galle but not to Trinco or KKS due to the possibility of getting drawn into possible conflict. New Delhi while ready to help Colombo out was not ready to risk its personnel or get dragged into unnecessary confrontation with the LTTE.
India however said that if the LTTE entered Indian waters in pursuit of the passenger ferry their navy and possibly air force would retaliate against the tigers. Such an eventuality never arose because the LTTE never were in hot pursuit.
An Indian coast guard ship came close to the “MV Pearl Cruise II” ready to provide assistance and protection. Indian Navy and Air Force were also alerted but not deployed due to the tigers giving up pursuit.
It is possible that the LTTE did not pursue the ship due to several reasons. The tiger boats were engaged in combat. The LTTE had no intention of getting into Indian waters and possibly confront the Indian navy or coast guard. There was also the reluctance to attack a passenger ship with unarmed personnel and a truce monitor on board.
Later tiger political chief Thamilselvan was to tell SLMM head Ulf Henricsson in Kilinochchi that the LTTE had let the “MV Pearl cruise II” escape because a Scandinavian monitor was aboard.
India has been reticent about the role it played in the episode. Just as New Delhi contacted Colombo telephonically to urge protection of Tamil civilians in Trincomalee India was now playing a quiet role in protecting the unarmed security personnel.
When journalists contacted Indian Defence ministry sources for information about the incident no details were forthcoming. It was admitted “off the record” that a Sri Lankan ship in trouble had got into Indian waters and that an Indian coast guard ship had provided assistance. The Indian NDTV said later that the Lankan ship had been escorted safely by India to a Sri Lankan port.
Meanwhile the raging sea battle was ending after nearly 80 to 90 minutes. The Lankan air force too got into the act in the final phase by sending Mi 24 helicopter gunships. The Mi 24 copters were of little utilitarian value as it was now dusk and the battle virtually over. The LTTE boats were returning to base in Chundikulam – Chalai.
T he personnel carrier had reached international waters with an Indian coast guard vessel close by and a naval ship looming on the horizon. The Lankan air force helicopters were trying to inflict damage. Norway and the SLMM was exerting strong pressure. The tigers had put two Dvoras out of action. At least one tiger boat was hit. So the LTTE called off the sea – borne operation and withdrew.
The personnel carrier ship which reached Indian waters remained at sea for a while. Indian ships stood guard. Meanwhile Colombo had started reprisal bombing and shelling on LTTE controlled areas in the North and East. It appeared that tiger fighting was over for the day.
The SLMM also obtained guarantes from the LTTE that the “Pearl cruise II” will not be targetted when returning.According to informed diplomatic sources Indian ships provided “quiet cover” to the Lankan ship to reach Lankan waters off the Jaffna peninsula .
The personnel carrier first tried to reach Trincomalee during night but thereafter the ship proceeded towards KKS. The plans were changed because tigers had assured the SLMM that it would not be harmed.The “Pearl Cruise II” arrived at about 1, 30 pm on May 12th morning near KKS.
The navy suffered the destruction of one Dvora. P- 418 was sunk by the tigers. It is said that the vessel commanded by Prasanna Edirisinghe had put up a heroic fight. It was responsible for hitting a tiger boat and staving off the sea tigers for quite some time. This enabled the passenger ferry with 710 men to escape.
P- 418 had fifteen crew and another officer Lt. Ratnaike aboard in addition to Edirisenghe. All seventeen were killed. Six navy boats conducted searches and after 36 hours recovered seven bodies.
P – 420 commanded by Wijewardene was also badly damaged. At one point it was thiought that the boat was about to sink. An airborne “casevac” (Casualty evacuation) mission was undertaken near Point Pedro to rescue captain and crew. The Dvora however did not sink and was towed back to KKS. It is extensively damaged and would require much refurbishing to be “ship shape” again.
P – 497 was also damaged but remains sea worthy. P – 421 that had a monitor aboard has some minor damage. Two sailors on board were injured. The injuries on the other two ships are not known.
The LTTE says it has lost four tigers while two were injured. Three of the killed tigers were women . All four killed were promoted posthumously by the LTTE. Their rank, nom de guerre , real names and hometowns are -
1. Lt. Col Pulichelvi – Jenita Pushparaja – Point Pedro.
2. Lt. Col Anbuvili – Amuthasumana Nageswaran – Aaliyawalai.
3. Lt. Col . Kaviyalagi – Shanthini Pedurupillai – Manatkadu (vadamaratchy east)
4. Major. Mathiyalagan – Kanthan Jesurajah – Kayts
Given the ferocity of the sea battle it does seem unbelievable that the LTTE losses were so little. Yet the divers searching for navy bodies have found the rear section of a tiger boat. It had four powerful outboard motors affixed . Traces of any other tiger casualties – if any – are yet to be found.
The SLMM says the LTTE atacked the convoy without provocation. The tigers say the ship encroached on the waters where they were engaged in training exercises. With two monitors on board two vessels that came under attack the SLMM will naturally rely on their eye witness accounts than tiger explanations.
According to knowledgeable Tamil sources the LTTE was suspicious that the personnel carrier was coming towards the peninsula to enhance the security forces strength. With the security forces transporting men and material under curfew to Nagar Kovil frontline from Palaly the LTTE feared a massive onslaught on Vettilaikerny and then Elephant pass.
It was in a way a pre- emptive strike by the tigers rationalise these sources.Though the tigers could have sunk the passenger ferry through its suicide boats the LTTE had refrained from doing so to try and capture the troops alive and also because the Finnish monitor was aboard they say.
The Sri Lankan authorities are saying that about five to eight LTTE boats were destroyed and more than fifty tigers were killed. The count is based on the assumption that ten to fifteen tigers on each boat.
At the same time Colombo also says the boats surrounding the ships were all suicide boats and that the sunk Dvora was rammed into by a tiger boat. A suicide boat with packed explosives does not have more than two black tigers on board. So the arithmetic seems to be faulty.
It appears that many sections of the national and international media are accepting the “official” version from Colombo. News reports say that more than five tiger boats were destroyed and at least fifty LTTE men were killed. Some reports even speak about a “mass funeral”.
There is also a conscious effort by sections of the media to glorify the sacrifices made by the naval personnel in fighting the tigers. The heroism displayed by some if not all navy men deserve praise. The commander of P – 421 Lt. Walgampaya has been openly commended by the monitor aboard the vessel.
The LTTE despite its victory in the sea battle has lost badly in political terms. It stands accused of flagrantly violating the ceasefire. The USA and EU have condemned tiger recklesness.
The tigers have incurred the wrath of the SLMM. It’s actions has brought about shelling and bombing in the North – East for which no international condemnstion is forthcoming.
Meanwhile the LTTE is embrioled in controversy about its rights to sea. The SLMM has also suspended naval monitoring until further notice.
The LTTE may have won the sea battle but it is fast losing the propaganda war with actions such as these.
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